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HYPNOSIS IN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM: THE STATUS
OF ITS ACCEPTANCE IN THE TRIAL SETTING
INTRODUCTION
H YPNOSIS IS A METHOD of therapy which has been utilized by society for quite
some time. Recently, it has gained popularity as a new device to be
used in the trial setting. Although it is a legitimate method of therapy in the
medical and psychological professions, in the hands of attorneys and the legal
system it takes on a whole new life. This new life is plagued with questions
of admissibility, reliability and suggestibility. This comment will examine these
questions and the use of hypnosis in the various stages of trial. This paper will
show that some courts hold such evidence to be per se inadmissible, whereas
other courts hold it admissible if reliability is shown. The use of hypnosis in
a limited setting appears to be the better approach.
I. HYPNOSIS IN GENERAL
Hypnosis has its roots with the Egyptians but gained notoriety through
Friedrich Anton Mesmer (1735-1815).' Mesmer took Paracelsus' (1490-1541)
theory that the body was influenced by a universal magnetic fluid and developed
"mesmerism." 2 "Mesmerism" was developed into "neurypnology" then
hypnotism3 by James Braid (1795-1860), and it achieved further prominence
through the work of Jean Martin Charcot (1825-1893)." It was from Charcot
that Sigmund Freud learned the techniques of hypnotism and brought it to
the Western world. 5
Hypnosis is a method of behavior study.6 It is defined as an altered state
of consciousness involving extreme suggestibility.7 The procedure' is intended
to bring about a heightened state of selective attention during which the per-
son focuses solely on the hypnotist's suggestions and ignores irrelevant stimuli. 9
'U. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 50-51 (4th ed. 1972).
2
"Mesmerism" was the theory that everyone possessed a magnetic force which could be used to influence
the magnetic force in other people and thus, effect cures. Id. at 50.
'Neurypnology comes from the Greek "hypnos", which means to sleep. See P. SHEEHAN & C. PERRY,
METHODOLOGIES OF HYPNOSIS 30 (1976).
4D. SCHULTZ, A HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 300-01 (2nd ed. 1975).
'J. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 52.
'Any attempt to practice hypnotism as a curative measure is deemed an illegal practice of medicine. See
generally Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1962).
'J. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 666.
'The procedure involves the use of verbal suggestion to produce a trance or dream-like state. The most
common procedures (there are several techniques) involve: 1) setting the patient at ease; 2) having the
patient focus on some stimulus (object or sound); and 3) telling the patient he is relaxed and should think
of nothing but what the hypnotist says. See R. SILVERMAN, PSYCHOLOGY 184-86 (2d ed. 1974).
9J. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 666.
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Once the subject is in a trance the hypnotist can use several techniques to ex-
plore the person's behavior. The two basic methods are age regression and
posthypnotic suggestion.'I Age regression involves having the patient relive an
earlier point in time. The subject will, for example, act, talk and think as if
he were a six-year-old child. Posthypnotic suggestion entails the hypnotist mak-
ing suggestions during the trance which are to be carried over to the conscious,
waking state."
Despite the long and widespread use of hypnotism, there are several short-
comings involved with its use. Generally, people can be hypnotized to varying
degrees. ' 2 It is possible for hypnotized subjects to willfully lie, ' 3 and it can have
a greater effect on memory when highly emotional material is involved."'
There are also problems associated with the two methods commonly
employed, regression and suggestion. With regression, it is impossible for even
a highly trained psychologist or psychiatrist to know when the patient is reliving
an actual memory or confabulating. 'I With suggestion, the problem lies in the
patient's tending to accept the events suggested during hypnosis as actual facts.
For instance, the patient will fill in any gaps in his or her memory with those
suggested by the hypnotist. To further compound the problem, the patient may
not be able to discriminate which of his or her memories occurred in hypnosis
and which memories were from his or her previous normal waking state.'6
II. HYPNOSIS IN THE COURTROOM
In this section, attempts to admit a witness under hypnosis are discussed.' 7
Although some of the cases deal with pretrial use of hypnosis (the subject of
the next section), the concern here is with attempts to admit actual hypnosis
at trial. Likewise, the section on pretrial uses of hypnosis contains cases involving
the admissibility of hypnotic statements. In that section, however, the main
'OR. SILVERMAN, supra note 7, at 515. See also J. COLEMAN supra note 1, at 666 for a discussion of other
methods.
"J. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 666.
'2Id.
"Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L. J. CLIN. AND EXPR. HYPN. 311, 313 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Orne].
1'R. SILVERMAN, supra note 8, at 186. See also Orne, supra note 13, at 315 where the use of hypnosis
with interested parties in a law suit is discussed.
"Orne, supra note 13, at 318.
'
6Id. at 320.
"It should be noted at the outset of this discussion that most of the cases dealing with hypnosis are criminal
cases. Indeed, only three civil cases are reported: Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); Wyller
v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th
Cir. 1975). In the criminal cases some writers point out a distinction when the evidence is offered by the
prosecution or the defense. See, Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979). However, the courts that have dealt
with the issue of hypnosis in both criminal and civil settings have deemed the rules on admissibility applicable
in both. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978),
and the courts addressing the prosecution-defense dichotomy have found the distinction artificial, See
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1980). Cases will not be differentiated on the basis of civil-
criminal or the party offering the evidence. (The only exception to this is in section IV where the constitutional
ramnifications of hypnotic testimony for the criminal defendant are discussed).
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concern is with hypnosis as a trial preparation technique. The overlap is evi-
dent and natural. The distinction drawn in the two sections is done in the hopes
of clarity, not confusion.
In the early years of hypnosis the courts refused to recognize it. 8 Therefore,
it was an illegal defense for a defendant to assert that the influence of hyp-
notism caused him to perpetrate a crime.' 9 Nonetheless, the courts in the develop-
ing years of hypnosis admitted evidence that a witness had been hypnotized
at some previous time. This evidence related to the credibility of the person
since it tended to show that someone could influence the witness."
Despite the advancements over the years in hypnosis and the admissibility
of such evidence in certain contexts,2 ' the courts do not allow a witness to testify
on the stand while under hypnosis.22 It follows from the same rationale,
therefore, that courts also do not allow demonstrations of hypnosis in the
courtroom. 23
The refusal by courts to play tapes made of a witness while under hypnosis24
follows as well from the above rationale. There is, however, another reason
to reject such recordings. Tapes of a hypnotized witness offered to prove truth
violates hearsay rules. 5 Thus, these self-serving statements will not be admitted
as substantive evidence unless there is a necessity for them and a guarantee
of their trustworthiness.26
III. PRETRIAL USES OF HYPNOSIS
Hypnosis is used in preparing for litigation to aid a witness in recalling
events pertaining to the trial issue. As has been noted, there are inherent short-
comings with hypnosis techniques. 7 There are also obvious admissibility
'People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
"People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 P. 689 (1894) (a woman was not allowed to claim that she
was under the influence of hypnotism when she killed her lover).
2 State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979);
State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981).
"See infra section III.
2Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.D. Va. 1976). In Greenfield the court held that
hypnotic evidence is unreliable. Therefore, due process guarantees are not abrogated when a defendant
is not allowed to testify while under hypnosis.
"People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App.2d 284, 288, 388 P.2d 495, 498 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The Marsh
court indicated that it was within the discretion of the trial court to allow a demonstration of hypnosis at trial.
"State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, __, 643 P.2d 246, 254 (1981).
"E.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(c) states: " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."; FED. R.
EvID. 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."
6State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965) (the fact that defendant made his hypnosis recording
to a doctor while in search of help may indicate trustworthiness, but it was inadmissible). Although such
recordings are not admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted, they may be admissible as the
basis of a doctor's opinion concerning the patient. See infra section Ill.
"See supra section 1.
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problems concerning such evidence. The problem goes beyond whether a witness
whose memory has been refreshed via hypnosis can testify at trial. Additional
problems encountered are whether evidence of hypnosis in general,2" pretrial
statements made while under hypnosis," or the hypnotist's opinion can be
admitted.30 Several states have held that any evidence of a hypnotic nature is
per se inadmissible,I whereas several other jurisdictions have held such evidence
to be admissible.32 In discussing admissibility, two issues are brought into focus.
The first concerns the proper foundation which must be laid for hypnotic
evidence. The second issue centers on the reliability of the particular hypnotic
techniques used.
A. Statements Made Under Hypnosis
Statements made prior to trial while the witness is under hypnosis are
generally not admissible to prove their truth. The reason for this is that they
are hearsay and unreliable.3 By holding such statements to be hearsay the courts
recognize that, "hypnosis is not a modality designed to determine truth from
deception."'34 Therefore, even with assurances that the witness had no reason
to lie, the statements are inadmissible." The courts find such statements to
be analogous to those obtained by truth serum or lie detector tests. Hence,
absent a stipulation by both sides, such evidence is inadmissible.36
Despite the rejection of pretrial statements made under hypnosis which
2 See People v. Mosdesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963); U.S. v. Awkard, 597
F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 and 969 (1979).
29See State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204
S.E.2d 414 (1974); People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); State v. Conley,
6 Kan. App.2d 280, 627 P.2d 1174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
"See Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp. 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); People v. Busch, 56 Cal.2d 868, 366
F.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 989 (1961); People v. Kester, 78 Ill. App.3d 902, 397 N.E.2d 888 (111. App. Ct.
1979). Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d
414 (1974).
"Lemieux v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz. 213, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Ct., 132
Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982),
stay denied, 101 S.Ct. 13 (1982); Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 246 S.E.2d 642 (1978); Strong v. State,
__ Ind. __ , 435 N.E.2d 969 (1982); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1982); People v. Hughes,
88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97,
436 A.2d 170 (1981); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
"See, e.g.: U.S. v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 969 (1979); Clark
v. State, 379 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978);
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), aff'g. 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super
Ct. Law Div. 1980); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc.2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Onondaga County. Ct. 1979).
"See Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d
231 (1974); State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App.2d 280, 627 P.2d 1174 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Beachum,
97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974); Greenfield v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
14Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L. J. CLIN. AND EXPR. HYPN. 358, 371 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Kroger & Douce].
"People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979). In Blair the witness, a neighbor
of the victim, was a neutral person who intended to tell the truth. She underwent hypnosis to aid her
in recalling who left the victim's house the night he was murdered. The court felt that it was still hearsay
to admit her statements which bolstered the defendant's alibi.
"State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App.2d 280, 285, 627 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
[Vol. 16:3
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are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, such statements may still
be admissible. Some courts will allow the statements to come in as a basis for
the hypnotist's opinion.37 Other courts leave it to the discretion of the trial
judge whether or not to admit such statements38 or merely hold such statements
to be inadmissible. 3
9
B. The Hypnotist's Opinion
The hypnotist who administered the pretrial hypnosis to the witness may
be called to testify. He may be asked to testify as to the witness' credibility
or the witness' state of mind at the time of the alleged criminal act.
1. The Witness' Credibility
Assessing the credibility of the witness is a function usually reserved to
the jury. Thus, allowing an expert to give testimony as to a witness' credibility
may invade the province of the jury. However, as an Illinois court noted:
We do not agree ... that the testimony of the hypnotist that the witness
was telling the truth would invade the province of the jury. We have...
determined that expert testimony in support of a witness' credibility is
admissible .... This does not mean that expert testimony is conclusive:
it is merely one more factor for the jury to consider in determining
credibility. 4
As a result, allowing the hypnotist to testify as to the patient's reliability while
under hypnosis is merely another piece of evidence for the jury to consider.
A Maryland court found such testimony to be a very important part of
the case.' It heavily weighed the expert's opinion on the subject's credibility
before allowing the hypnosis testimony into evidence. This certainly appears
to be unreasonable in light of the problems associated with hynpotic statements. 2
Other courts have held such testimony inadmissible. 3
Courts employ another approach towards testimony on a witness' credibility
under hypnosis. This approach is to not admit such evidence unless the witness'
character is challenged. 4 Thus, unless and until an adverse party brings out
the fact that the witness had been previously hypnotized, an expert cannot testify
"See e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); People v. Modesto,
59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963).
"People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App.2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
"State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 405 P.2d 492 (1965) (inadmissible as basis for hypnotist's opinion that
defendant had amnesia following a car accident).
'People v. Kester, 78 I11. App.3d 902, 910, 397 N.E.2d 888, 894 (111. App. Ct. (1979)) (citations omitted).
"Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 247, 246 A.2d 302, 312 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 949 (1969); Harding v. State has been overruled, Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d
1272 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
"See supra section I. See also Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974), where the
court stated that an objection to such testimony may well have been sustained. Id. at 510 n.7.
"E.g., Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
"U.S. v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 969 (1979).
Winter, 1983] COMMENTS
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on the efficacy of hypnosis."5 In addition, once the hypnotist is allowed to testify
he can speak only of the witness' character for truthfulness, not the witness'
ability to recall a particular event."'
2. The Witness' State of Mind
The courts in several states have refused to allow a hypnotist to testify
as to a defendant's state of mind at the time of an alleged crime.47 Their reason
for refusing such testimony was that no adequate foundation had been laid
for such testimony. Thus, if a court is not convinced of the reliability of hyp-
nosis, it may feel that a jury can decide a defendant's state of mind as well
as an expert can decide the same question. 8 This is true even when the sole
issue is the sanity of the defendant. 9
C. Laying A Foundation
The necessity of laying a foundation" has already been discussed.5 Courts
will not admit pretrial statements52 or an expert's opinion on the patient's state
of mind into evidence53 unless a foundation for such evidence has been laid.
When evidence of a new technique such as hypnosis is sought to be introduced
at trial, "the proponent ... must establish (1) the reliability of the method,
usually by expert testimony, (2) that the witness furnishing such testimony is
properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the subject, and (3) that
correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case." ' The issue thus
becomes: What constitutes an adequate foundation? Most of the states discuss-
ing the question use the Frye test as the standard. One prominent decision,
however, chooses a variation of the Frye standard.
5 6
1. The Frye Test
The Frye test involves a set of standards which govern the admissibility
of the results of scientific tests. It was developed in Frye v. United States."'
In Frye, the court would not admit results obtained from a "deception test,"
"Id. at 670.
"6d.
"4See People v. Busch, 56 Cal.2d 868, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d
1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied,
336 So.2d 1184 (1976).
"Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
"'Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1184 (1976).
"A foundation entails asking a witness preliminary questions to establish admissibility of evidence. See,
e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104.
"See section Ill(A) and Ill(B)(2) of text.
"Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
"People v. Busch, 56 Cal.2d 869, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961).
'People v. Diggs, 112 Cal. App.3d 522, 531, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
"See infra section III(C)(I) for a discussion of the Frye test and the states accepting it.
"See infra section 11(C)(2).
"293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
[Vol. 16:3
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a crude form of our present lie detector or polygraph machine. The court stated
that in order to admit the results from such scientific methods or mechanical
devices, "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs." 8
Since the Frye test is the standard to use for mechanical testing methods,
the issue becomes whether hypnosis is properly classified as a mechanical
method. "Unlike voiceprints, fingerprints, blood alcohol analysis, and other
techniques, the hypnosis issue is not centered upon an expert's interpretation
of data or results obtained from physical tests." 59 The hypnotic technique,
however, is scientific. Therefore, despite the fact that the testimony of a patient
is the end product of such a technique, the induced recall is still "dependent
upon, and cannot be disassociated from, the underlying scientific method." 60
Thus:
Although hypnotically-adduced "memory" is not strictly analogous to
the results of mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Frye rule is
equally applicable in this context, where the best expert testimony indicates
that no expert can determine whether memory retrieved by hypnosis, or
any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood, or confabulation.
2. A Lesser Standard
The New Jersey courts have adopted a different standard for the
admissibility of hypnotic evidence than most other courts. New Jersey recognizes
that the Frye standard will usually render hypnotic results inadmissible due
to their scientific inaccuracy.62 Thus, to allow hypnotic evidence to be admitted,
New Jersey's standard requires tests to have a sufficient scientific basis to pro-
duce uniform and reasonably reliable results which will contribute materially
"Id. at 1014.
"State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz. 180, 198, 644 P.2d 1266, 1284 (1982).
6"Polk v. States, 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
'State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980). One court has varied the Frye technique for determining
reliability of scientific procedures. The Georgia courts follow the rule that a procedure must be generally
accepted in the scientific community; but they allow the trial judge, rather than experts, to make that
determination. They state:
[T]he Frye rule of "counting heads" in the scientific community is not an appropriate way to
determine the admissibility of a scientific procedure in evidence .. . .We hold that it is proper
for the trial judge to decide whether the procedure or technique in question has reached a scientific
stage of verifiable certainty, or in the words of Professor Irving Younger, whether the procedure
"rests upon the laws of nature."
Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 522, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982) (footnotes ommitted).
"State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'd., 86 N.J. 525,
432 A.2d 86 (1981).
We must immediately recognize that no claim is or can be made that hypnotically-induced recollections
are scientifically accepted as reliable to the extent, for example that a breathalyzer is accepted as
a device to measure the level of alcohol in the blood. It must be conceded that as a technique or
procedure for determining "truth," hypnosis would fail to satisfy the Frye test of general acceptance
in the scientific community.
Id. at 361, 414 A.2d at 305. See also, Orne, supra note 13.
Winter, 19831 COMMENTS
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to the ascertainment of the truth. 63
This standard depends upon the reliability of the procedures used rather
than their ability to revive "truthful or historically accurate recall." ' 64 New Jersey
accepts the fact that the purpose of hypnosis is not to obtain the truth. "In-
stead, hypnosis is employed as a means of overcoming amnesia and restoring
the memory of a witness." ' 65 As a result, after Hurd, hypnotically-induced
testimony will be admissible in New Jersey when it is demonstrated "that the
use of hypnosis in the particular case was a reasonably reliable means of restoring
memory comparable to normal recall in its accuracy." 66
The problem with New Jersey's standard is whether a hypnotic trance can
ever accurately produce a memory comparable to normal recall. W. Putnam
conducted an experiment whereby subjects viewed a video tape of an accident. 67
After all subjects viewed the tape one-half were hypnotized. Then all the sub-
jects were asked two kinds of questions. One type was leading questions with
an incorrect answer suggested. The second type was objective questions. For
the leading questions with the incorrect answer suggested, the hypnotized sub-
jects made significantly more errors than the non-hypnotized control group.
On the objective questions, no difference between the two groups was observed.
These results suggest that a reconstructive theory of memory is more accurate
than an exact copy theory. 68 They also lead to a questioning of the benefits
of hypnosis in refreshing recollection. When leading questions are asked, as
is common on cross-examination, the hypnosis has a contrary effect. When
objective questions are asked, the hypnosis has no beneficial effect. Therefore,
there appears to be little advantage in employing hypnosis.
3. The Necessary and Sufficiency of Foundations
One court has held that the necessity of laying a foundation no longer
exists if the jurisdiction previously accepted the admissibility of hypnotic
evidence. In U.S. v. Awkard69 the court stated:
In jurisdictions in which the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed evidence
is still an open question, a foundation concerning the reliability of hyp-
'State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981), aff'g., 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (N.J.
Ct. Super. Law. Div. 1980) (citing State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384, 389 (1967)).
6"Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
6SId.
"Id. The New Jersey court stated, however, that in certain instances the tougher Frye standard would
be met. This will occur when those individuals in our society particularly akin to suggestibility and the
hypnotic procedure are used as witnesses.
"Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 27 INT'L. J. CLIN. AND EXPR. HYPN. 437 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Putnam].
"Id. at 445. A reconstructive theory is where a normal subject relates his memory as best he can by unaided
recall. An exact copy theory is where hypnosis is used to retrieve the memory as it actually happened,
unhampered by subconscious screeing processes.
"597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 and 969 (1979).
[Vol. 16:3
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nosis is no doubt necessary.. . . But admissibility of such evidence has
not been an issue in the federal courts of this circuit .... Because there
is no issue about the admission of hypnotically refreshed evidence, there
is no need for a foundation concerning the nature and effects of hypnosis."0
Thus, once a jurisdiction accepts hypnosis, an expert does not have to testify
on techniques before the previously hypnotized witness testifies. However, the
court has discretion to admit such foundational evidence."
Despite the fact that a proper foundation has been laid, hypnotic evidence
will not always be admitted. In addition to laying the appropriate foundation,
a proponent must show that, "the techniques employed were correctly peformed,
free from bias or improper suggestibility." 72 Thus, to have evidence of hyp-
nosis admitted in most jurisdictions two criteria must be met: 1) a proper foun-
dation must be laid and 2) the reliability of the procedures must be shown.73
D. The Reliability of Hypnotic Evidence
The courts have always recognized the need to insure reliability of the pro-
cedures used to induce hypnosis." "[T]he scientific reliability ... is [not] suf-
ficient to justify the use of [the] test results ... in the serious business of criminal
prosecution." 75 Consequently, the courts have always had, at least, minimal
procedural safeguards, such as requiring a qualified hypnotist.76
Once a proponent satisfies these minimal safeguards, several courts have
been quite willing to admit recollection which has been refreshed by hypnosis.
They view such testimony as the witness' present recollection, regardless of
how it was obtained. Thus, the testimony is admissible with the fact of prior
hypnosis going to the credibility of the witness.
In Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 8 the plaintiff was the lone survivor
of a helicopter crash which occurred four years before the trial began. The
court would not exclude the plaintiff's testimony merely because he underwent
"'Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
"Id. If, however, such evidence is admitted without the court exercising its discretion or without the
previously hypnotized witness' credibility being attacked, there is reversible error.
"State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, -, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (1981).
"In New Jersey the sole criteria is that the reliability of the procedures used must be demonstrated.
"See, e.g., Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Hughes, 99 Misc.2d 863,
417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Onodaga County Ct. 1979); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981).
"People v. Harper, Il1 111. App.2d 204, 209, 250 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
"See, e.g., People v. Bush, 56 Cal.2d 869, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961) (hypnotist with less
than one year experience is not qualified); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (four years experience with hypnosis is sufficient
qualification despite no formal training). (Harding v. State has been overruled, Collins v. State, 52 Md.
App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)).
"See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp. 503
F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); State v. McQueen, 295
N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
"503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).
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hypnosis to refresh his memory. "We cannot accept Fairchild's argument that
Wyller's testimony was rendered inherently untrustworthy by his having
undergone hypnosis. Wyller testified from his present recollection, refreshed
by the treatments. His credibility and the weight to be given such testimony
were for the jury to determine." 79
Some courts have analogized the use of hypnosis to the showing of a docu-
ment to refresh recollection. 0 They view the fact of pretrial hypnosis as going
to the weight of the testimony not the witness' competency."1 A good example
of this rationale appears in State v. McQueen. 8 2 In McQueen, the witness saw
a murder that took place five years earlier. The defense tried to exclude that
witness' testimony since her memory was restored by hypnosis. The court said:
The fact that the memory of a witness concerning events, distant in time,
has been refreshed, prior to trial, as by the reading of documents or by
conversation with another, does not render the witness incompetent to
testify concerning his or her present recollection. The credibility of such
testimony, in view of prior uncertainty on the part of the witness, is a
matter for the jury's consideration. So it is when the witness has, in the
meantime, undergone some psychiatric or other medical treatment by which
memory is said to have been refreshed or restored. So it is when the inter-
vening experience has been hypnosis.8 3
Other courts have been more cautious in admitting testimony previously
refreshed by hypnosis recognizing the great potential for the tainting of such
evidence by hypnotic suggestions. In State v. Koehler," a witness had a dif-
ficult time identifying the defendant's car. Following hypnosis the witness could
positively identify the defendant's car as the one he saw on the night in ques-
tion. The court found the hypnotically refreshed testimony to be "incriminating
in the extreme, and its admission into evidence highly prejudicial."85 Therefore,
on remand the court would only let the witness testify as to matters which were
"previously and unequivocally disclosed by him to the authorities, prior to the
hypnosis." 86
Another example of where the court is concerned with a subject's own
recollections becoming tainted by suggestions received while under hypnosis
is United States v. Adams.87 In Adams, the witness' posthypnotic statements
"Id. at 509.
"E.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975).
"Id. at 1069-70.
82295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
"Id. at 119-20, 244 S.E.2d at 427-28.
.4312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981).
"Id. at 310.
86Id.
"7581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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differed so much from his prehypnotic statements that the prosecutor impeached
him on the discrepancy. To lessen the opportunity for suggestion during the
hypnotic procedure, the court recommended that the trial court should main-
tain a complete stenographic record of the hypnosis session."8 By allowing the
judge, the jury and the opposing party to know who was present, as well as
the questions that were asked and the answers given, the posthypnotic effect
can be ascertained.
8 9
The court in People v. Smrekar9t recognized the importance of the Adams
procedure. Nevertheless, it did not feel that such a stringent process had to
be followed in order to determine if testimony had been tainted by hypnosis.
In Smrekar, the hypnotist was a doctor with ten to fifteen years of hypnosis
experience. Only the doctor and the witness were present during the sessions,
and the doctor testified that he did nothing suggestive during the sessions. In
addition, the witness' testimony was corroborated by other evidence. Based
on all of these factors, the Illinois court felt that it could determine that the
testimony was not tainted by hypnosis without seeing a tape of the sessions.9
The necessity of employing safeguards to avoid admitting testimony tainted
during the hypnosis procedure has been accepted by the courts since Adams.
The courts disagree as to whether a recording of prehypnotic testimony is
essential92 or whether factors such as those found in Smrekar are sufficient
indices of reliability. 93 They do agree, however, that the testimony must be
examined for factors of suggestibility by the trial judge "in the first instance,
as a question of admissibility, rather than by the jury as a matter of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence." 9 '
Despite the advancements over the years in hypnosis and the safeguards
taken by the courts, some jurisdictions still hold that any memory refreshed
by hypnosis is inadmissible per se. 95 These courts are concerned that the danger
of confabulation and suggestibility would pose a threat to our system of justice.
As Martin Orne, 96 a prominent psychologist in the hypnosis field, stated, "as
"AId. at 198-99 n. 12. The court also stated that an audio or video recording of the session would be helpful.
891d.
9068 Ill. App.3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
9'd. at 387-88, 385 N.E.2d at 855.
9'Lemieux v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz. 214, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982) (before hypnotizing a potential witness
the party intending to offer the witness' recollection must appropriately record by written statement, tape
recording or preferably videotape form the prehypnotic recollections of the subject).
"Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (the hypnotist's statements that he had no
knowledge of the case were sufficient for the court to determine that no posthypnotic suggestions were
made to the witness while he was under hypnosis).
"4Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 395, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
"E.g., State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 527, 611 P.2d 551 (1980). See also supra note 31. While, however,
some courts hold memory refreshed by hypnosis to be per se inadmissible, no jurisdiction has held that
the fact of hypnosis precludes all testimony from a particular witness. Thus, a witness can testify as to
events remembered prior to undergoing hypnosis. See, People v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d
387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
"Martin T. Orne is both a psychologist and a psychiatrist. He is the head of the University of Pennsylvania
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a rule, the average hotel credit manager is considerably more adept at recognizing
deception" 97 than are experienced hypnotists.
One of the leading cases to hold hypnotically refreshed testimony to be
per se inadmissible is State v. Mack.98 In Mack, the victim awoke in a motel
room with a serious cut through her vaginal muscle. Due to her intoxicated
state she could not remember how she received the wound. The police had her
interviewed by a self-taught, lay hypnotist who told her she would remember
the events of the night in question. Before trial the defense sought to exclude
the victim's testimony due to its unreliability. The trial court heard testimony
from five experts before certifying the issue of admissibility to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. The Minnesota Supreme Court held the hypnotically refreshed
testimony of the victim to be inadmissible.
The court in Mack based its conclusion on the unreliability of the hyp-
nosis experience. It agreed with the two experts who stated that the hypnotist's
direction, "You will remember very clearly everything that has happened on
the 13th and 14th," '99 created a posthypnotic suggestion. The suggestion was
to remember everything after the hypnosis session as it was related therein.
The threat of confabulation and "filling-in the gaps" made her testimony
unreliable. The court stated:
The crux of the problem is that hypnosis can create a memory of percep-
tions which neither were nor could have been made, and, therefore, can
bring forth a "memory" from someone who cannot establish that she
perceived the events she asserts to remember. Neither the person hypnotized
nor the expert observer can distinguish between confabulation and accurate
recall in any particular instance. 10
As a result under the Frye standard of admissibility, the results were not found
to be scientifically reliable or accurate. Therefore, the court felt that the victim
was incompetent to testify.
The case of State v. Blanchard'"' followed the holding in Mack. In
Blanchard, the defendant was convicted of killing a young girl. The prosecu-
tion called to the stand a friend who had been with the defendant the night
of the murder. The witness' memory was previously refreshed by hypnosis due
to his intoxication on the night in question. Although the court did exclude
the testimony, they noted that, "the hypnosis in this case does not indicate
the potential for suggestion apparent in our previous cases."' 02 The court fur-
hypnosis laboratory and is editor-in-chief of the Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis.
"Orne, supra note 13, at 334.
"292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
"Id. at 769.
'"Id. at 769 (footnote omitted).
0315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1982).
"'Id. at 430.
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ther stated that despite their adherence to the Mack approach, they were will-
ing to consider future developments in the area of hypnotic evidence.'1
3
The court in Greenfield v. Robinson' 4 also held hypnotically refreshed
testimony inadmissible as unreliable. In Greenfield the defendant was given
a ride by a girl. As he was getting out of the car he blacked out. When he
awoke she was dead. The court would not allow testimony as to his statements
under hypnosis. It stated, however, that if there was some other evidence to
corroborate the hypnotically refreshed testimony then it would have been
admissible. 05
These two cases, Blanchard and Greenfield, indicate that the per se rule
of inadmissibility for hypnotic evidence may not be too strong. The courts in
both of these cases recognized that these were poor fact situations on which
to admit hypnotic testimony. In Blanchard, the witness was drunk on the night
in question. Therefore, any memory revived would be blurred at best. In
Greenfield, the defendant was the only witness. Therefore, he could confabulate
any story without worry of contradiction. Thus, these two cases are good ex-
amples of when a court should not rely upon the accuracy of hypnosis.
Likewise in Mack, the facts were appropriate for holding the hypnotically
refreshed testimony inadmissible. In Mack, the witness was drunk at the time
in question, and the hypnotist had no formal training. Further, the police, but
not defense counsel, were present at the hypnotic questioning. Finally, the session
took place long after the crime when none of the refreshed recollection could
be corrobrated.' 06 As a result given these facts it would have been more pre-
judicial than probative' 7 to admit such testimony.
On the facts before it, the court in State v. Hurd'8 recognized the inap-
propriateness of allowing testimony that has been refreshed by hypnosis into
evidence. It did not, however, hold such testimony to be per se inadmissible.
In Hurd, someone stabbed the victim through the window while she was sleeping
in her ground floor apartment. Since she was unable to describe her assailant,
the police had her hypnotized. During the session, two police officers were
present. Following the session the victim was unsure of the validity of her recall.
The two police officers encouraged her to accept her new memory and iden-
tify the defendant. At trial, defense counsel was successful in barring the victim's
testimony. The New Jersey appellate and supreme courts affirmed the deci-
sion, but would not hold such testimony to be per se inadmissible.
1031d.
101413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
'"Id. at 1120-21.
"01292 N.W.2d at 772.
'"Evidence which is more prejudicial than probative, although relevant, is usually excluded. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 403.
"'86 N.J. 525,432 A.2d 86(1981), affg 173 N.J. Super. 333,414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
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The Hurd court felt that a per se rule was unnecessarily broad. It felt that
such a rule would "result in the exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy
as other eyewitness testimony." 09 As a result the Hurd court felt that hynotically
refreshed testimony should be excluded only if it is not at least as reliable as
ordinary recall. To determine if such testimony is at least as accurate as normal
human memory, one must examine the procedures that are used to elicit the
recall. In other words, "[t]he object of this review is not to determine whether
the proffered testimony is accurate, but instead whether the use of hypnosis
and the procedure followed in the particular case was a reasonably reliable means
of restoring the witness' memory.""'  Thus, if the procedures followed are
reliable, the court will assume that hypnotically refreshed testimony is at least
as accurate as normal recall.
The Hurd court adopted six procedures with which a proponent must
comply in order to demonstrate that the hypnotic process was reliable."' These
procedures are:
(1) an experienced hypnotist must conduct the sessions.
(2) the hypnotist must be a neutral party.
(3) any information on the case given to the hypnotist prior to the
session must be recorded. This will allow a determination of the
information which the hypnotist could communicate to the patient.
(4) before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should record the patients'
prehypnotic recollection of the facts in the case.
(5) all contact between the hypnotist and the patient must be recorded.
(Videotaping is encouraged but not required.) This will enable a court
to determine if any suggestions or information were transferred during
the session. 1 12
(6) only the hypnotist and the patient should be present at any phase of
the sessions. I I 3
Some states have rejected the rationale and procedures outlined in Hurd.
In Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch,"4 a witness who was having nightmares
'"Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94. The court cited evidence of how ordinary recall can be unreliable. Examples
of this problem include the following: (1) memory naturally consists of confabulation; (2) interrogation
distorts memory; and (3) interrogation can suggest answers.
"'Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
''The Mack court noted these procedures without adopting them. 292 N.W.2d at 771 n. 14 (Minn. 1980).
"'in People v. Nixon, 114 Mich. App. 233, 318 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), the court allowed
the defense to play prehypnotic and posthypnotic tapes of a prosecution witness to the jury. This was
done to allow the jury to decide the credibility of the witness' posthypnotic testimony. The court allowed
this not because of their affinity for hypnotic testimony, but rather because the testimony was not prejudicial
It stated: "While the playing of the prehypnotic testimony and posthypnotic testimony is relevant to show
that the error of allowing . . . [the witness] to testify about his hypnotically refreshed testimony is not
prejudicial, we do not hold that this procedure will justify the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony.
Id. at 237 n.I, 318 N.W.2d at 658 n.I.
86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
'496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981).
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came forth three years after a young boy was murdered. Her recall was hazy
because she was on drugs at the time of the murder. Therefore, the police had
her hypnotized to restore her memory. The court rejected the witness' testimony
and the rationale of the Hurd court. It stated:
[A]t this time, we remain unconvinced that the trier of fact could do
anything more than speculate as to the accuracy and reliability of
hypnotically-refreshed memory . . . . It is unchallenged that a jury can
more critically analyze a witness' ability to perceive, remember, and
articulate his recollections when such testimony has not been hypnotically
refreshed. The probative worth of the hypnotically-adduced evidence can-
not overcome the serious and fundamental handicaps inherent therein." 5
The court in People v. Shirley ' 6 also rejected the Hurd position that the
six procedures would forestall the dangers of hypnotic evidence." 7 Further,
the Shirley court found that some of the possible dangers with hypnosis were
not even addressed by Hurd."8 The Shirley decision suggests that even if re-
quirements adequate in theory could be devised to forestall the dangers of hyp-
notic evidence, they would inject "undue delay and confusion into the judicial
process.'" I9
This position was reiterated by a Michigan court in People v. Gonzales. '0
The Gonzales court went further, however, in stating that acceptance of such
standards would diminish any value hypnotically derived testimony may possess.
"The standards themselves, would give the hypnotic process an aura of reliability
which, in actuality, it does not possess. It is far too likely that a jury would
be even less critical of the testimony because of the indicia of reliability pro-
vided by such standards."' 2 ' Thus, the Michigan court felt that by trying to
improve the reliability of hypnotic testimony an impossible situation is made
worse.
Still, others are not quite so willing to cast-off any and all uses of hyp-
nosis. Certainly, "there must be care taken in the employment of the techni-
'Id. at 109. 436 A.2d at 176-77. Once again the facts of the case indicate the court's reluctance to admit
hypnotically refreshed testimony.
'31 Cal.3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982), U.S. app. pndg.
"'Id. at 39 n.24, 641 P.2d at 787 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.24. The court cites as an example the
requirement that the session be recorded to enable a court to determine what information was transferred
to the witness. Yet it is recognized that even experts cannot tell when cues are being conveyed. See also
supra section I.
I"Id. E.g., that the subject will lose his critical judgment, will confuse actual recall with confabulation,
and will exhibit confidence in the validity of his new recollection.
I"Id. at 40. Examples of the things which would cause the delay are elaborate discovery demands, parades
of expert witnesses, and excessive pretrial hearings and appeals. "In our opinion, the game is not worth
the candle." See also, Hilgard & Loftus, Effective Interrogation of the Eyewitness, 27 INT'L. J. CLIN. AND
EXPR. HYPN. 342 (1979), where the authors suggest, "It may be too much to expect that the precise controls
available in the laboratory be used in non-experimental settings in the real world." Id. at 354.
'20108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
1'Id. at 160, 310 N.W.2d at 313.
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que and there must be good cause."' 22 Once such criteria are met, however,
it may be more prejudicial to justice to exclude such testimony than to admit it. 123
E. Hypnosis In Pretrial Investigation
Several courts, while holding evidence hypnotically-adduced to be per se
inadmissible, have noted the propriety of using hypnotic techniques in the investi-
gatory phase of a case.' 24 They recognize the usefulness of hypnosis in eliciting
leads and bringing forth new information.' 2 When hypnosis is used for such
purposes, however, some courts still require that the Hurd standards be
followed." 6 The drawback in using hypnosis at the investigative stage is that
the subject hypnotized cannot later be used as a witness at trial.'27 This puts
a party in "the difficult position of choosing whether to use a particular witness'
testimony at .... trial or to subject that witness to hypnotism as an investigatory
tool." 28
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The use of hypnosis to aid in the investigation, prosecution or defense
of a case can lead to the possible abridgment of constitutional rights. If hyp-
nosis can cause confabulation, hypnotist-suggested testimony or incorrect
answers to leading questions,' 29 then proponents of such evidence may be guilty
of destruction of the evidence or using unduly suggestive techniques. Such effects
may be found violative of due process. '30 It has been held, however, that denying
a defendant the opportunity to testify while under hypnosis is not an abridg-
ment of his or her due process rights. 13 1 Similarly, refusing a demand by the
defendant that the complaining witness be hypnotized to refresh his or her
recollection has also been held not to be a denial of due process.' 32
'"State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, - , 649 P.2d 845, 847 (1982).
"'Arizona Chief Justice Holohan commented in a dissent on the exclusion of hypnotically induced recall
which had been corroborated at trial. He stated:
While much has been written by this court on the subject of hypnosis, the facts of this case illustrate
the absurd result caused by this court's current rule on hypnotically developed recall. The testimony
of the witness subjected to hypnosis was corroborated by an indepdnent non-hypnotized witness.
To cast aside the corroborated testimony of this victim and witness does more damage to our system
than the phantom dangers described by the several opinions of this court on the subject.
State v. Stolp, 133 Ariz. 213, -, 650 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1982).
"'See, e.g., State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18,
641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. (1982), stay denied, 103 S. Ct. 13 (1980).
"'A recent study was done on 53 victims and witnesses in 23 different cases. It showed that hypnosis in
the investigative stage led to new information being found in 60% of the cases. Kroger & Douce, supra
note 34.
"'See, e.g., Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); People v. Gonzales,
108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
"'The subject cannot be used to testify to any material pertaining to the subject of his hypnosis. He still
can testify on totally unrelated matters.
"'State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232 n.l, 624 P.2d 1974, 1280 n.l (1981).
"'See supra, section 1; Putnam, supra note 67.
"'See U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV.
"'Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
"'People v. Renslow, 98 111. App.3d 288, 423 N.E.2d 1360 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
[Vol. 16:3
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When hypnosis is used by, under or in conjunction with law enforcement
personnel, it is clearly an identification proceeding.' 33 The issue of unduly sug-
gestive procedures becomes an important question when hypnotically derived
testimony is used to aid in identifying a defendant. The general rule is to let
a witness testify, with any evidence that suggestive means were used to refresh
his recollection going to the weight of his testimony. 3 , In the case of identifi-
cation evidence, testimony cannot be given if unduly suggestive means were
used in the identification procedure.'" The United States Supreme Court has
outlined the standard for pretrail identification proceedings. 3 6 The procedures
must not be "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification""'3 as to violate due process.
A Florida appellate court has held that a witness can testify as to an iden-
tification made if he or she is no longer under hypnosis at the time of the
identification.' 38 The Hurd court takes the approach that once reliability is
shown, due process is no longer an issue. If reliability is not shown, then the
hypnotically induced evidence is not admissible and due process never becomes
an issue. 139
Defendants have raised the issue of whether the prosecution's use of pretrial
hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory violates their right to confront their
accusers. One court stated that when the use of hypnosis evidence is exposed
and the defense is allowed a prolonged and rigorous cross-examination, the
right of confrontation is not denied.'" An Arizona court, however, stated:
"[TIhere is a strong belief among several authorities that hypnotism of a witness
renders subsequent cross-examination ineffective." 2 In essence, the use of hyp-
notism may so alter the witness' previous recollection that a defendant is denied
an effective cross-examination of the witness. "Because the person hypnotiz-
ed is subjectively convinced of the veracity of the 'memory,' this recall is not
susceptible to attack by cross-examination."" 3 Thus, the right to confronta-
tion may be denied.' 44
'People v. Hughes, 99 Misc.2d 863, 871, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1979).
'"People v. Smrekar, 68 I11. App.3d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (I11. App. Ct. 1979).
."Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
.361d.
'"Id. at 302. See also, U.S. v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252, 282 (E.D. Mich. 1977), for a dicsussion on
the differences between identification of a person and testimony that relates events.
"'Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
1'"86 N.J. at 548, 432 A.2d at 98.
"
0
1U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (Or. Ct. App. 1971).
"'State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981).
"'State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 1980).
"4In Mena the court stated, "Cross-examination is a right so essential to protection of criminal defendants
that it has been held to be a vital part of the federal constitutional right of confrontation." 128 Ariz.
at 232, 624 P.2d at 1280.
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On the other hand, an Illinois court has held that the right to confronta-
tion is denied only if the hypnotist testifies as to what the patient said under
hypnosis. If the patient himself takes the stand, no denial of confrontation
exists. "While the hypnosis could affect the mind of the witness in such a sub-
conscious way that the cross-examination could not reach, all witnesses are,
to some extent, subject to subconscious stimuli similarly obscure." '
Another sixth amendment right which has been raised with respect to hyp-
notic evidence is the right to assistance of counsel. The issue usually arises when
a defendant has sought to have the state provide a hypnotist along with
appointed counsel. In those instances the defendant is attempting to use hyp-
nosis to gather data on the motivational factors that were present at the time
of the alleged crime.'1
6
In Cornell v. Superior Ct., "I the defendant was accused of murder. He
had no recall due to intoxication at the time of the crime. Defense counsel sought
to have the defendant examined by a hypnotist. The sheriff and the trial court
both refused saying it would not make a difference as such testimony was
inadmissible. On appeal the California courts reasoned that the issue was not
one of admissibility but rather was one of the accused's defense. In order to
prepare a proper defense, the defendant should have been allowed to ascer-
tain the facts surrounding his crime.'"8 The court stated:
To make that right effective, counsel is obviously entitled to the aid of
such expert assistance as he may need in determining the sanity of his
client and in preparing his defense .... The use of hynotism for the pur-
pose desired is recognized by medical authorities ... There is no substan-
tial legal difference between the right to use a hypnotist in an attempt
to probe into the client's subconscious recollection and the use of a
psychiatrist to determine sanity.'4 9
Georgia has held that the refusal by the prosecution to turn over statements
made by the defendant while under hypnosis is not an abridgment of effective
assistance of counsel.'° But several courts have held that there is a duty of
"'People v. Smrekar, 68 III. App.3d at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855.
"'Kline, Defending the Mentally 11: The Insanity Defense and the Role of Forensic Hypnosis, 27 INT'L.
J. CLIN. AND EXPR. HYPN. 375 (1979). Kline goes on to say:
to summarize the situation in which the use of hypnosis may become an integral part of the insanity
plea on behalf of the mentally ill or emotionally disturbed defendant, one might say that the expert
witness in a broader context has four major contributions to make other than to the trial itself:
(a) advising on the question of the "trialability" of the defendant; (b) giving information and advice
on the appropriate disposition of the convicted criminal; (c) providing techniques for developing
self-awareness and contributing to the reform of the convicted criminal; and (d) advising on questions
connected with the defendant's release from custody.
Id. at 379.
"52 Cal.2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).
"MId. at 102-03, 338 P.2d at 449.
"'Id. (quoting In re Ochse, 38 Cal.2d 230, 231, 238 P.2d 561 (1951)).
"'Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974).
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a proponent of hynotic evidence to make a timely disclosure to the court and
opposing counsel.'" One court has even suggested that the defendant may be
constitutionally entitled to such material." 2 Whether or not the duty reaches
consitutional proportions, the court in Miller noted, "where such a duty has
not been discharged, a motion for a new trial must be granted if there is a
significant possibility that the undisclosed evidence might have led to an acquittal
or a hung jury .... "I"
CONCLUSION
Hypnosis has advanced greatly since the time of Mesmer. Unfortunately,
the modern experts are in agreement that hypnosis is not a means for deter-
mining truth. The possibility of inaccuracy is so great that even trained ex-
perts find it difficult to determine when a subject is lying or confabulating.
In addition, there is the risk that a hypnotist will consciously or unconsciously
leave a suggestion with the subject. This suggestion can surface as posthypnotic
memory. To make matters worse, the subject cannot always distinguish posthyp-
notic and prehypnotic memory.
Despite all of these shortcomings, hypnosis does have a place in litiga-
tion. The shortcomings of hypnosis are prevalent only when it is used in an
improper manner. The experts agree that hypnosis cannot determine veracity.
Thus, it should not be used to ascertain the truth of a matter. This, after all,
is a matter for the trier of fact to decide.
The strength of hypnosis lies in its ability to aid in recall. Recall is never
totally accurate no matter how it is refreshed. As a result hypnosis should not
be discarded as a means for refreshing recollection merely because it is as inade-
quate a method as any other. It is a legitimate method which can work well
in some instances and poorly in others. Thus, it should be utilized in those
instances for which it is suited, and laid aside, but not discarded, in those in-
stances in which it is inappropriate.
"'See, e.g., Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Lemieux v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz.
214, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), aff'g., 173 N.J. Super. 333,
414 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). An additional problem arises when the state admits that
it subjected a witness to hypnotic treatment but claims that the witness was never actually hypnotized.
The Arizona courts summed up the situation when it stated:
We do not at this time establish a burden of proof for the state to meet when it asserts that
one of its witness subjected to a hypnotic session was in fact never hypnotized. We encourage the
state to avoid such situations because of the difficulty of proving when someone subjected to hypnosis
has or has not entered a hypnotic trance.
State v. Stolp, 133 Ariz. 213, __ , 650 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1982).
"'U.S. v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969). "[TIhe hypnosis had arguably placed at least some obstacle
in the way of one of the most valuable protections accorded Miller by the Sixth Amendment - the possibility
that the sanctity of the oath and effective cross-examination might lead Caron [prosecutrix witness] to
recant his identification or at least to admit doubt." Id. at 832. See also, id. at 831 for a discussion of
the necessity of disclosure under the Jenck's Act.
"'Id. at 830-3 1. See also, People V. Angelini, - Colo. App. -, 649 P.2d 341 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)
(where there is an intentional suppression of evidence by the prosecution after the defense has requested
specific information, the materiality standard is "[wihether the suppressed evidence or information might
have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at -, 649, P.2d at 343).
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Of course, certain precautions must be undertaken in the use of hypnosis.
The procedures outlined by the court in Hurd do not necessarily define the
state of the art. Yet, they are a starting point. Psychology and hypnosis deal
with the individualized study of man. Therefore, it should not be surprising
that certain procedures work better with some subjects than others. To utilize
a method of psychology our legal process must be willing to flex its structured
system. This flexing of the system may cause additional troubles and delays.
Our system of justice, however, is not designed to be the least burdensome
or swiftest. It is designed to be the best.
JOEL R. HLAVATY
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